Horizontal Europeanization

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Transnational Sense of Community in Europe: An Exploration with Eurobarometer Data

Jan Delhey, Katharina Richter and Emanuel Deutschmann

Abstract: The ongoing crises in Europe have revived the debate about whether Europeans possess or should possess a "sense of community". Conventionally, sense of community is investigated on a *supranational* dimension, approached mainly via concepts such as European identity or Euroscepticism. A different, heavily under-researched dimension is *transnational* sense of community, e.g. the attachment to other countries. In this paper we examine the extent to which Europeans feel transnationally attached to other countries, the geographical scope of this attachment, and the factors influencing it. 2010 Eurobarometer data (EB 73.3) provide the following insights: (1) The majority of EU citizens does feel attached to other countries. (2) Transnational practices, education, and minority status predict attachment to other countries, (3) EU citizens clearly feel more attached to other European countries than to non-European countries. In the discussion we contrast these findings with what is known about supranational approaches, to carve out to what extent transnational attachment is an independent component of Europeans' sense of community.

Contact:
Prof. Dr. Jan Delhey
Professor of Sociology
Jacobs University Bremen
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Campus Ring 1
D-28759 Bremen, Germany
j.delhey@jacobs-university.de

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1   Introduction

For decades, scholars have been debating whether Europe requires social integration along-side economic and political integration (e.g. Haas, 1958). It has often been argued that feelings of belonging, community and solidarity are an integral part of any unification project (Anderson, 1983; Brubaker, 2010; Münch 1996). A whole variety of issues, from European identity (Kaina, 2009; Sanders et al., 2012), to trust in co-Europeans (Delhey, 2012; Klinge-mann and Weldon, 2013) and solidarity among European citizens (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2013; Habermas 2011) have become central sociological topics in research on European integration. The European Union itself has embraced this need for social integration latest with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 in which the union's member-states pledged to create "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (European Union, 2010). The European unification project is thus generally seen as requiring a social base which has an interest in keeping the integration project alive (Milward, 1997; Therborn, 1995).

   The goal of the present paper is twofold. It first seeks to conceptually disentangle the various approaches to measuring subjective unity among Europeans. Building on Karl Deutsch's (1953, 1957) work, we propose 'sense of community' as an umbrella term for these various approaches to social integration of Europe. We further argue for distinguishing between supranational and transnational dimensions of sense of community and suggest that the current focus on the supranational dimension of sense of community needs to be redressed in favor of more attention to the transnational one. Building on this idea, we then examine empirically one transnational construct of sense of community that has not been subject to investigation previously: the attachment of EU citizens towards other countries. To do so, recent Eurobarometer data (EB 73.3, 2010) is analyzed using logistic regression models.

   This article proceeds as follows: The next section provides an overview of sense of community and its measurements. Based on this groundwork, the research objective and hypotheses are delineated. Next, the data is introduced and the results are presented. Finally, the results are summarized and discussed.

2   Measuring Sense of Community

In the 1950s, Deutsch et al. defined *sense of community* as "a matter of mutual sympathies and loyalty; of 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of co-operative action in accordance with it" (1957: 36). The broadness of this definition makes 'sense of community' a suitable umbrella term to subsume a variety of approaches that investigate the subjective dimension of social integration beyond the nation state. Figure 1 gives an overview of our categorization of these approaches. We suggest that sense of community consists of two dimensions: a) a *supranational* (vertical) dimension which is concerned with Europe/the EU as an entity and b) a *transnational* (horizontal) dimension which focusses on the interrelations between individuals and countries that Europe/the EU is composed of. Most of the sense of community constructs can be conceptualized along either dimension. For instance, trust may be investigated with a supranational focus ('trust in the EU') or with a transnational focus ('trust in other European countries'). European identity, support for European integration, or Euroscepticism are notable exceptions with an exclusive supranational focus. In the following, we describe the two dimensions and their elements in detail.


Figure 1. The two dimensions of sense of community

2.1 The Supranational Approaches

The concepts which we subsume under the term supranational SOC are European identity, support for EU, Euroscepticism, trust in Europe/EU, solidarity with the EU, and attachment to Europe/the EU (cf. Figure 1), all of which we discuss briefly in the following.

First, there is an abundant literature on **European identity** (for an excellent overview, cf. McMahon, 2013). European identity is commonly defined as a form of self-identification which supersedes the container of the nation state, taking the EU or Europe as its frame of reference (Fuchs et al. 2009; Kaina, 2009).Levels of European identity are sometimes claimed to have risen over time (Bruter, 2005) or at least to be stable if low overall (Green, 2007), while others rather report a general lacking of European identity (Duchesne et al., 2013). Moreover, European identity has been shown to increase support for the EU in general (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2004).Whereas some believe that European identity will become ever more important for integration processes in the EU (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Schmidt, 2006), others are more skeptical regarding a Europeanization of identities (Majone, 2006; Duchesne et al., 2010).Still, the notion of European identity appears rather abstract and is, in spite of its increasingly central role in research, somewhat weakly demarcated.

Second, **support for the EU**, and third, **Euroscepticism**, are further approaches to supranational SOC that can be described as positive and negative variants of attitudes towards Europe's political integration respectively. In fact, in terms of operationalization, Euroscepticism and EU support studies practically employ the same items reversely coded (cf. Boomgarden et al., 2011). Applying these concepts can be an end in its own right (i.e. is Euroscepticism on the rise?), or a test for other constructs (i.e. does European identity determine support for European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Many different conceptualizations of EU support or Euroscepticism have been investigated, ranging from general Euroscepticism (Elenbaas and De Vreese, 2008; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010) over pro-European feelings (Evans, 2000) to support for the Euro or enlargements of the union (e.g. Karp & Bowler, 2006). This diversity has resulted in a lack of conceptual precision, but the general idea is to arrive at an understanding of public opinion towards the EU as a supranational entity. Summarizing the general trend of findings, EU citizens appear to increasingly disapprove or be skeptical of the EU as a whole – yet this development is strongly influenced by socio-structural cleavages (Hix, 2008; Hobolt, 2009).

Fourth, **trust** can be conceptualized as "political" trust directed towards political or societal institutions on the one hand, or as "social" trust flowing between individuals and/or groups of people on the other (Newton, 2007). The former version can easily be categorized under the supranational dimension of SOC. Political trust in the EU as a whole or in its institutions has been a relatively popular topic, with recent publications asserting that political trust should be seen more holistically: trust in EU institutions goes hand in hand with trust in their national counterparts (Munoz et al., 2011), while general political attitudes and personal characteristics are more important than i.e. institutional performance for trust levels (Arnold et al., 2012; Harteveld et al., 2013).

Fifth, **solidarity with Europe/the EU** is another conceivable concept of supranational SOC that however has not been thoroughly investigated as of now. Bruter (2012) for instance mentions solidarity with political decisions taken at the European level, yet does not closely examine this issue further (looking at *trust* in the European commission instead).

Sixth, there is **attachment to Europe/the EU.** Very often, empirical studies have blurred the distinction between attachment to Europe and European identity, ultimately measuring European identity via the proxy of attachment to Europe/the EU (e.g. Lewicka, 2008; Schlenker, 2013). Yet, while some argue that "identity relates to an individual's intensity of positive attachments" (Carey, 2002: 391), others have found that it is not quite the same as attachment: "even among those whose identity is ostensibly exclusively national, roughly half of the respondents still express attachment to Europe" (Citrin and Sides, 2004: 171).

Moreover, attachment to Europe/the EU– just as most other variants of supranational SOC –developed against the backdrop of national self-identifications and consequently tends to be investigated along the binary division of national vs. European (e.g. Vobruba, 2008). Although such dualistic notions have been increasingly criticized by scholars and hybrid forms of identity have become advocated (cf. Risse, 2010), the underlying categorical assumption of national and European/regional/world has hardly been challenged in quantitative empirical research with the exception of localized cross-border studies so far. White suggests that the framing of attachment to Europe at large risks that "one forces opinions to be expressed on highly abstract matters which respondents have rarely engaged with, and infers attitudes and beliefs which have been barely formed" (2009: 699).

In addition, with the near-complete focus on supranational approaches, other aspects of sense of community have been widely ignored or remain underdeveloped. We propose that

a sense of community which exceeds the geographical boundaries of the nation state container can but need not necessarily be manifested in a supranational format. If we accept that the existence of a European sense of community is not automatically tied to "Europe" or "the EU" as a fixed, predefined supranational level, but may as well emerge from transnational ties beyond national borders, we can develop novel approaches to measure it. Such approaches may allow us to shed light on the processes of Europeanization from different angles.

2.2   The Transnational Approaches

Under the term *transnational SOC*, we summarize ways to assess sense of community which do not require a direct (vertical) connection of individuals with Europe/the EUbut which instead build on horizontal connections between individuals or countries *within* Europe/the EU. In contrast to the supranational perspective on SOC, this transnational dimension has the advantage of being located at a level which is more salient to individuals. We identify four concepts that fit under this definition: trust in and solidarity with other Europeans/ European countries, transnational cohesion, as well as attachment to other Europeans/ European countries.

First, **trust in other Europeans/European countries** has of late attracted some scholarly interest. Delhey (2007, 2012) and Klingemann and Weldon (2013) have investigated what they call *transnational (dyadic) trust,* i.e. generalized social trust between EU nationalities or fellow EU citizens. These authors agree that transnational trust between EU country dyads is slowly increasing over time, and find that modernization or economic development, cultural characteristics and diversity, as well as "power in the international system" influence transnational trust levels.

Second, **solidarity with other Europeans** and third, **transnational cohesion** constitute additional relevant research areas. Both cohesion and solidarity represent values of respect which bind together the member states of the EU as well as its citizens (cf. Lisbon Treaty, 2006).Recently, researchers have begun to address these concepts by empirically analyzing specific forms of solidarity in Europe, such as the will to support fellow EU countries in financial difficulties (Lengfeld et al., 2012),or the acceptance of equality of rights among Europeans(Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2013). Apart from these survey-based studies, experimental

settings with public good provision games and dictator games have been used to examine transnational solidarity among European citizens (Kuhn and Solaz, 2014).

Finally, the alternative approach put forward in this paper focuses on another under-researched aspects of transnational sense of community: the ***attachment of EU citizens to other countries***. Specifically, it holds that transnational attachment can find its expression in horizontal connections with other countries. If Romanians should feel attached to Belgium, Cypriots to the UK, and Greeks to Sweden, it would be seen as an instance of transnational sense of community. In fact, it is well possible that supranational forms of sense of community (such as European identity) are a result of a densification in lower-level forms of transnational attachment. From this perspective, looking for transnational sense of community should even take precedence over the vertical approaches.

Antonsich and Holland point out that "territorial attachment has been both under-theorized and infrequently subjected to empirical analysis", although it has been established that "individuals can simultaneously maintain loyalties and attachments to different territorial aggregates" (2014: 208; cf. Herb and Kaplan, 1999).Aside from studies on **attachment** to one's own nation or Europe in the identity approach fashion, the construct has not been given much attention – whether Europeans feel attached to other European countries or peoples (transnational attachment) has not as yet been explored.

3   Feeling attached to other countries: Deriving Research Hypotheses

This paper explores empirically whether and to what extent a transnational SOC in the form of attachment to other countries is prevalent within the population of the EU-27 countries. We derive our hypotheses from previous empirical research on supranational SOC, especially on European identity, the hitherto most thoroughly examined component of SOC.

The most basic question concerns the extent to which SOC exists among Europeans. Previous findings have been largely controversial: for European identity, for example, quantitative designs often report significant if low levels of European identity at least as part of a multiple identity, while the strength of European identity is generally perceived to be rather weak (e.g. Citrin and Sides 2004;Fuchs 2013; Green, 2007). Moreover, some qualitative studies have revealed that sizable segments of people do not identify with Europe (Diez-

Medrano, 2010; von Arnim, 2006), or are indifferent to Europe: Duchesne et al. recently summarized this phenomenon by stating that "most of our respondents were overlooking Europe in the sense of ignoring, not seeing it, not keeping it in view" (2013: 5); indifference has also been reported by statistical data (e.g. Van Ingelgom, 2012). Following this stipulated lack of identification with Europe, we hypothesize that

H1: The majority of EU-citizens does not feel transnationally attached to other countries.

We then investigate what the micro-level determinants of feeling attached to other countries are. In doing so, we follow Deutsch's (1953) transactional paradigm, which holds that SOC derives from interactions and communication acts between individuals. Here cognized that feelings of belonging arise from the intensification of societal relations. Partially inspired by his work, several scholars have now started to systematically examine the cross-border interactions of EU citizens (e.g. Delhey et al., 2014; Fligstein, 2008; Kuhn, 2011; Mau et al., 2008; Recchi, 2012; Recchi and Favell, 2009). The underlying assumption of the transactional paradigm is that micro-level connections and practices "scale up" and impact on macro-level social processes (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). We expect that

H2: Transnational practices constitute the most influential predictor of transnational attachment, even after socio-structural factors are controlled for.

In a final analytical step, we analyze to which extent transnational attachment is Europeanized, i.e. focused on Europe. An actual *European* SOC depends not only on respondents from Europe professing transnational attachment in the first place, but also on whether European countries are preferred over non-European countries. Such external closure cannot be automatically taken for granted: Hennis (2001) for instance suggests that Europeanization and globalization are indistinguishable trends overall (cf. also Delanty and Rumford, 2005). Similarly, Faist considers it still "an empirical question […if…] transnational transactions are global or regional"(2010: 1673) in their effects. In order to assess the Europeanization of transnational attachment, we employ the twofold relative Europeanization approach (RE-Index) proposed by Delhey et al. (2014) that integrates both national openness and external closure in its measurement of Europeanization. The EC dimension allows to empirically dis-

tinguish Europe from non-Europe. By calculating the share taken by the European reference frame relative to national and global reference frames, the authors have shown that while supranational SOC approaches (e.g. identity, solidarity) are characterized by national openness, they are not externally closed, resulting in medium scores on the relative Europeanization (RE-) index. As the authors found no external closure for the supranational dimensions of SOC they investigated, we suggest that

H3: Those respondents who do indicate an attachment to other countries do not favor other European countries over countries in the rest of the world (no external closure).

Any external closure of transnational attachment would probably reflect integrative effects stemming from, for instance, geographical and cultural proximity, shared history, or the political and economic integration project of the EU (cf. DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann, 2011). It must further be considered that even high levels of transnational attachment to other European countries would not automatically translate into high levels of *European* transnational SOC, if they stemmed predominantly from strong binational ties as opposed to more diverse attachments to multiple countries. For example, strong ties between Germany and France are first and foremost a sign of French-German friendship and not necessarily a sign of an actual European SOC. Therefore, we do not only look at levels of transnational attachment, but also at its centralization. In the words of social network analysts Borgatti et al., "centralization refers to the extent a network is dominated by a single node" (2013: 159f.). Accordingly, in our work we take the extent to which transnational attachments of Europeans are dominated by single other countries into account.

The overall level of relative Europeanization may thus differ between EU societies as a result of variation in national openness, external closure as well as centralization regarding transnational attachment.

4 Data & Variables

To test these hypotheses, we quantitatively examine Eurobarometer 73.3 data (henceforth *EB 73.3*, European Commission 2010). For EB 73.3 on average 1,000 EU citizens above the age of 15 in every member country of the EU (but ca. 500 participants in the smaller coun-

tries Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus and about 1,500 participants for Germany and the United Kingdom) were interviewed between March and April 2010. Only valid entries, i.e. only those respondents who actually answered the question items under investigation, are considered in the working sample of this study which has a sample size of 24,033. Wherever the object of this paper is an analysis of EU citizens at large, an EU-27 weight for all member states (W22 in the original dataset) is used so that each observation is evaluated in proportion to its actual share in the total EU population aged 15 and over (cf. GESIS, 2013).

4.1   Dependent Variable

We measure transnational attachment to other countries with EB 73.3 question QB10a/b that asks "Which country other than (OUR COUNTRY) do you feel the most attached to?" This question allows respondents to state the name of any country they feel connected with[1]. Since we are first interested in the degree to which EU citizens are transnationally attached to other countries and what might determine such attachment (cf. hypotheses 1 and 2), rather than in which specific nations have been named, responses to QB10a/b have initially been recoded into a dummy variable "attached" and "not attached". To then discover how much EU citizens are Europeanized in their attachment to other countries (hypothesis 3), a further recoding of QB10a/b results in a variable with the categories "European Country" and "Non-European Country" that combined with question QB13.5 ("Please tell me how attached you feel to… (OUR COUNTRY)") represents the three different geographical reference frames required for the calculation of the relative Europeanization index. One problem involved in the country recoding of QB10a/b is that the Eastern borders of Europe are fuzzy and opinions differ on which countries can be considered European, and which not. To deal with this issue, we compare two definitions of Europe. On the one hand, a strict definition that includes the EU countries and their immediate neighbors ("Core Europe"), and on the other hand a loser definition that encompasses all the countries which are sometimes counted to Europe, including states that the United Nations classifies as transcontinental ("Europe Plus"). With regards to Europeanization, it should also be noted that to use Delhey et al.'s (2014) approach for transnational data, an adaptation is necessary: since we are interested in European transnational SOC rather than binational SOC, we adjust the computation of the Index of relative Europeanization by including the degree of centralization of

transnational attachment (i.e. we control for the share of the most named other country in each member state).

4.2   Independent Variables

We explore the individual-level determinants of transnational attachment by looking at transnational practices as well as socio-demographic control variables whose operationalization is discussed in the following.

Transnational practices are operationalized via a *transaction index* (hereafter *TRACI*, cf. Delhey et al., forthcoming), which is based on QB6. QB6 is a battery of 12 items that relate to cross-border practices, such as having friends abroad, travel to foreign countries, or having lived abroad. After dummy coding each item, an additive index (TRACI) is created which ranges from 0 (an entirely non-transnational life-style) to 12 (a very transnational life-style).

Socio-demographic variables have been shown to play a role in predicting supranational SOC, and thus are potentially relevant for transnational attachments as well. According to Fligstein (2008) for instance, being younger, higher educated and coming from a higher socio-economic background increases the likelihood to identify supranationally. The generally strong results for higher education suggest a leading role of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970) also for transnational attachment. We operationalize cognitive mobilization using an indicator for *education*, measured as years in full-time education, recoded into a categorical variable distinguishing those who have 15 or less years of education from people with 16 to 19 or more than 20 years of education and those who currently still study.

Having inherited ties to other countries through migration or minority status also tends to strengthen cross-border identifications (Faist, 2010; Nowicka, 2006). After all, the majority of the literature on transnationalism is concerned with the connections between two or more countries as a result of people's migratory behavior (for many others, cf. Bauböck and Faist, 2010). To account for this, two dummy variables, one for having foreign roots (*Parents of respondent foreign born*) and another one for considering oneself to be a minority member in society (*Minority status*) are included in our analysis.

Lacking a proper income variable (not included in EB 73.3), we proxy socio-economic status by the variable *Occupation* (recoded into six categories: manual workers, self-employed, managers, other white collar workers, retired, and other (mainly unemployed and students).Finally, we also include *Age* (continuous measure), *Gender* (male or female dummy

coded),*Internet use at home* (yes or no dummy coded)and *Type of Residence* (rural, small town, or urban), which have sometimes been found to influence supranational sense of community (e.g. Fligstein, 2008).

5 Results

5.1 To Which Extent are EU Citizens Transnationally Attached?

The first hypothesis stated that the majority of EU citizens will not feel connected to another country. Looking at the data, however, it turns out that this hypothesis is not supported: across the entire sample (EU-27), a slight majority of respondents (54%) feels attached to at least one other country in the world.

Considering the member states one by one (Fig. 2, Fig. 3A), it becomes obvious that in some countries along the Eastern and Southern periphery of the EU feelings of transnational attachment are indeed not professed by a majority of the population: In Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Slovenia, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, less than 50% of respondents report this kind of sense of community. The heat map (Figure 2) nicely illustrates this belt of least transnationally attached societies at the borders of the EU, whereas the geographically more centrally located societies and island states are much more transnationally attached. In fact, in most EU countries (17) and across the EU-27 at large, a majority of respondents does feel attached to other countries (in Luxembourg and Sweden even more than 80% of respondents). Figure 3A additionally provides a ranked overview of the country levels of transnational attachment.

As mentioned above, we also enquire after the centralization of transnational attachment in order to extricate whether high levels of transnational attachment are encompassing multiple other countries or rather result from close binational friendships. Thus, we calculated the centralization of transnational attachment, i.e. we established the single other country with the largest share of namings for each European society. Ultimately, the greater the share of the most named country, the higher the centralization of transnational attachment. Figure 3B reveals substantial variation in centralization of transnational attachment across EU member states. For example, in Cyprus, of all respondents that are attached to other countries, more than two thirds have named Greece. At the other end of the scale, in Sweden, the most named country UK accounts for only 10% of all named countries. The be-

tween-country differences in centralization are so large that we believe accounting for cen-tralization when dealing with transnational data, for instance when measuring the Europea-nization of transnational SOC (Section 5.3. below), is important to mitigate the dominance of single country relationships: the strong connection Cypriots feel with Greece cannot be suffi-cient to sustain a pan-European SOC[2].


Figure 2. Transnationally Attached Population

Figure 3. Country levels of transnational attachment

5.2   Determinants of Transnational Attachment: The Role of Transnational Practices

In studying attachment to other countries further, our interest lies in the exploration of factors that influence EU citizens' transnational attachment. More specifically, we contend that transnational practices will turn out as the most essential predictor of transnational attachment (H2). With the help of robust logistic regression models which are specified to control for single countries, potential individual-level determinants of attachment to other

countries are tested. A set of three regressions are computed to unravel whether transnational practices really play a decisive role in attachment to other countries: M1 estimates the impact of transnational practices without control variables (TRACI as the only predictor variable),M2includes all predictors except for TRACI, and a third model estimates TRACI's impact, controlling for the whole set of socio-demographic variables (M3). Table 1 summarizes the model results.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Only Transactions: Attachment	Only Controls: Attachment	Full Model: Attachment
Transaction Index	.473*** (.01)		.434*** (.01)
Education(Ref: <, = 15 years of educ.)			
16-19 years of education		.339*** (.04)	.219*** (.04)
20+ years of education		.682*** (.05)	.301*** (.05)
still studying		.674*** (.08)	.514*** (.08)
Internet Use at Home (1=yes)		.445*** (.04)	.233*** (.04)
Minority Status(1=yes)		.538*** (.06)	.222*** (.07)
Foreign-Born Parents (1=yes)		.978*** (.05)	.137* (.06)
Occupation (Ref: manual workers)			
other		.089 (.05)	.061 (.05)
retired		.035 (.05)	.011 (.06)
self-employed		.171** (.06)	-.013 (.07)
manager		.284*** (.06)	.099 (.07)
other white collar workers		.116* (.05)	.065 (.06)
Gender (1=male)		.121*** (.03)	.053 (.03)
Age		-.003* (.00)	-.001 (.00)
Residence (Ref: small town)			
rural		-.052 (.03)	-.004 (.04)
urban		.107*** (.04)	.038 (.04)
Constant	-.506*** (.08)	.008 (.12)	-.807*** (.13)
-2LL Null	-16496	-16496	-16496
-2LL Model	-13171.3	-14523.8	-13042.4
Chi2	4009.4	3103.7	4259.8
Degrees of freedom	27	41	42
Significance of Chi2	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo-R^2	0.20	0.12	0.21

Data: Own calculations based on EB 73.3. N = 24033. Notes: ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$. Robust Logistic Regression. Country differences are controlled for.

Table 1: Logistic Regression Transnational Attachment

M1 confirms the statistically significant role of transnational practices (b=0.473, p<.001) for transnational attachment. In fact, a calculation of odds ratios reveals that a one unit increase in TRACI (i.e. one additional transnational practice on the index) increases the odds of feeling

transnationally attached by 60%. But also socio-demographic variables seem to matter: M2 shows that all controls included in the model are significantly related to transnational attachment. The strongest socio-demographic predictors of transnational attachment are having foreign-born parents and higher education. Respondents with occupations at the upper end of the scale, urban, minority, male, and younger populations, as well as internet users are more likely to be transnationally attached as well.

The final model combines both TRACI and the socio-structural factors. The inclusion of TRACI renders several of the socio-structural predictors insignificant, suggesting that their significant effects in M2 solely occurred because transnational practices were not yet accounted for. In fact, it is differences in transnational practice connected to age, gender, occupation, or residence location that are important for transnational attachment, not the structural positions themselves. In contrast, the effects of education, internet use at home, foreign-born parents and minority status decrease in size but remain statistically significant next to transnational practices in M3. Converting the unstandardized coefficients in Table 1 into standardized odds ratios reveals that among the significant predictors of transnational attachment, TRACI is the strongest (a one unit increase multiplies the odds of being transnationally attached by 1.54). Comparing the explained variances of Model 3 with the model containing only transnational practices (M1) suggests that adding socio-structural control variables next to TRACI does not improve the estimations very much (McFadden's R-squared rises modestly from .20 to .21 through their addition).Similarly, leaving out TRACI worsens the attachment model across all pseudo-R-squared indicators (cf. M2). Thus, while other factors may play a role, transnational practices are essential for transnational attachment, corresponding to our initial second hypothesis and reinforcing Deutsch's transactional paradigm.

5.3   How Europeanized is Transnational Attachment?

Finally, we investigate the Europeanization of transnational attachment among EU citizens. First, we concentrate on the external closure dimension of relative Europeanization, i.e. we examine whether Europeans prefer European to non-European countries in their transnational attachment and thereby produce cognitive closure of the region to the rest of the world.

While it is worth to remember that 46% of all respondents across the EU-27 are not trans-nationally attached whatsoever (cf. Section 5.1), European countries are clearly the recipients of most transnational attachment: 42% of the respondents do identify primarily with other European countries, as opposed to 12% that choose a non-European state. That is, of those EU citizens who are attached to other countries in the first place, more than three quarters name a European country as the first foreign country they feel attached to. Note that these results apply if we define Europe itself very strictly ("Core Europe"). Results change only by a small margin if we loosen our concept of Europe to encompass all countries that are on occasion counted to Europe ("Europe Plus"): the percentage of respondents who feel attached primarily to European countries increases to 43.5% (80.6% of the transnationally attached), while those who profess attachment to non-European countries accordingly diminishes to 10.5% (equal to 19.4% of the transnationally attached).

Figure 4A shows the external closure of the EU-27 countries, ranked by strength. Attachment to European countries exceeds that to non-European ones across all member states (i.e. all values exceed .5), indicating that fellow European states take on a central role in Europeans' transnational attachment. External closure is highest in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where about 96% of all transnational attachments refer to European countries. On the other side of the spectrum, we find the United Kingdom, where only slightly more than half of all transnational attachments go to European countries. Figure 4A furthermore reveals that in some societies, it does make a difference which definition of Europe one uses ("Core Europe" or "Europe Plus"): the strongest impact resulting from widening the definition of Europe is evident for the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, and Germany, where closure scores increase largely due to the inclusion of Russia and Turkey as "European". Thus, contrary to the expectations in hypothesis 3, EU citizens clearly favor Europe over non-Europe in their transnational attachments, despite some observable variation among member states. Although no external closure could be found for indicators of supranational SOC (cf. Delhey et al., 2014), it evidently is pronounced for transnational attachment.

Figure 4. Europeanization of transnational attachment among EU citizens

The external closure dimension is however only one part of relative Europeanization that needs to be complemented by national openness (i.e. taking into account in how far Europeans are attached beyond national borders relative to their own country) if we desire to find out how Europeanized transnational SOC really is. Using our adapted version of Delhey et al.'s (2014) Europeanization approach, in which we additionally consider the inverse of centralization (see above), we calculate the relative Europeanization index of transnational attachment for the EU-27 countries (depicted in Figure 4B). Citizens of the Netherlands and Sweden are the most Europeanized in their transnational attachments: both populations

demonstrate high shares of national openness, a mid-field position with regards to external closure, and very low centralization. Cyprus and Slovakia rank lowest on the Europeanization index, a result mainly due to their very high levels of centralization. The example of Slovakia and the Czech Republic in particular confirms that controlling for centralization in transnational SOC is important. Both countries would have been among the top five countries on the Europeanization index if centralization had not been accounted for, most likely due to the fact that these two countries constituted a political entity until 1993 and their citizens still share many a bond. Including centralization corrects for the dominance of such binational relationships.

6   Conclusion

In this paper we have first argued that sense of community (SOC) constitutes a suitable umbrella term for subsuming a wide range of concepts that deal with subjective societal integration in Europe, from European identity to solidarity and trust between Europeans. We differentiated between supranational SOC, focused on the EU or Europe as a whole on the one hand, and transnational SOC, extending horizontally towards other countries, communities, and individuals. As most previous SOC research has investigated the supranational dimension, leaving the transnational dimension under-researched, we chose to address this gap and analyzed a specific form of transnational SOC empirically, namely the transnational attachment of Europeans to other countries. In doing so, we arrived at three major insights:

- Even though the majority of EU-27 citizens is transnationally attached to other countries, in ten societies located at the Eastern and Southern borders of the EU less than half of the population is transnationally attached. Transnational attachment is most pronounced in the centrally located countries and the island nations. Such a pronounced geographical pattern is reminiscent of Stein Rokkan's conceptual map of Europe, for whom central Europe surrounding the city-belt was also the least self-contained region (cf. Flora et al., 1999).

- Transnational practices constitute a very important determinant of transnational attachment, next to education, internet use, and minority status. Transnational attachment appears to have a different determinant structure than supranational SOC, where gender, age, and socio-economic status commonly play a larger role.

- Transnational attachment of Europeans is characterized by external closure (i.e. a preference for other European countries relative to non-European countries) across all EU-27 populations. Nevertheless, there are notable country differences in the overall relative Europeanization index of transnational attachment, resulting from different degrees of transnational attachment and centralization. Sweden and the Netherlands are the most Europeanized populations, while Cyprus and Slovakia rank lowest on the index.

This first exploratory analysis of transnational attachment has proven very fruitful as there is reason to believe that transnational SOC is qualitatively different from supranational SOC. Although roughly the same amount of respondents express transnational and supranational SOC (just over 50% are transnationally attached; a similar proportion of EU citizens endorse e.g. a supranational European identity) and average national openness levels are comparable, too, transnational attachment is distinctively marked by high levels of external closure both on average and in each member state population. In contrast, for the forms of supranational SOC (European identity, European solidarity) investigated by Delhey et al. (2014) no such preference for Europe over the rest of the world could be found. Moreover, transnational practices have a much stronger influence on transnational attachment than on supranational attachment (regression results for "attachment to the EU" available upon request), suggesting that transnational and supranational SOC also possess divergent determinant structures. The pronounced influence of transnational practices supports the transactionalist paradigm based on Deutsch's (1953, 1957) work at least for transnational attachment.

In the analysis it has proven crucial to account for centralization when investigating transnational SOC to avoid inflated index scores due to strong binational ties between countries. Especially when one wishes to investigate transnational SOC in a European integration context, it should be attempted to keep the likelihood of mistaking binational special relationships (i.e. the attachment between Slovakians and Czechs) for European SOC to a minimum. Taking centralization into account is already standard practice in social network analysis (e.g. Borgatti et al., 2013), and very useful for empirical analyses working with transnational data as well.

In conclusion, our analysis of one form of transnational SOC has disclosed promising first results. Further research is needed to expand our knowledge, and most importantly clarify

the relationship between supranational and transnational SOC. Several concrete research suggestions to be explored include but are not limited to the following:

1. Why is transnational attachment so much more pronounced in some countries than in others? Are there any macro-level explanations for these differences? Considering the strong influence of transnational practices on transnational attachment, it is likely that structural factors which enable people to engage in cross-border activities will be instrumental.

2. The dyadic nature of the data can be exploited much further. Who names whom and for what reason (e.g. cultural similarity, historical bonds, aggregate transaction rates, etc.)? Is it possible to reveal clear-cut "friendship circles" among nations, similar to voting blocs in the European Song Contest (Dekker, 2008; Ginsburgh and Noury, 2008)?

3. Of special interest is the relationship between transnational and supranational SOC. In how far is there overlap or complementarity between transnational and supranational SOC? Does transnational SOC have a unique influence on factors relevant to the European unification ideal, e.g. unification support?

In sum, investigating transnational next to or jointly with supranational SOC may lead to a much better understanding of European community formation.

7 Appendix

Core Europe	Europe Plus
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslavia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Kosovo,Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Scandinavia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Vatican City	Core European Countries + Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey

Table A1: Country Coding "Europe"

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[1]Another question in EB 73.3 enquires after a second country respondents are attached to. However in this paper, we concentrate only on the mentioned item QB10a/b.

[2]Accounting for centralization is exclusively necessary for the transnational dimension of SOC considering the possibility of mistaking binational relations for transnational ones; the supranational dimension is less ambiguous in this regard.

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